Various telephone calling and billing arrangements have been developed over the long history of the telecommunications industry. From operator-controlled local and long distance calls to automatic direct dialing to newly emerging computer telephony calling over data networks, and from plain-old-telephone service (POTS) to collect calling, to calling card, toll-free calling and pre-paid calling—among many others—the telephone industry has been continually seeking to apply new technologies to provide new and more flexible telephone calling services.
Electronic and optical switching, transmission, signaling, and database storage of many kinds have expanded the reach of telephony techniques to many new and enhanced applications. These and a variety of processors and other facilities embedded in, or linked to, more traditional facilities in the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) have still further enlarged the spectrum of telephone services available to the public.
One telephone service area that has developed rapidly in recent years is that of providing telephone communications to inmates in jails, prisons and other confinement facilities, sometimes referred to as Inmate Calling Services (ICS). While ICS contexts involve functions in common with everyday home and business calling, and with calling from public facilities such as airports and hotels, special issues arise that are peculiar to ICS. Thus, for example, controls over timing, duration, allowed called destinations, and billing—among many others—must be addressed in planning and implementing ICS.
An important goal in providing ICS is call efficiency—despite the need to observe the many constraints characteristic of ICS calling. Thus, for example, automation of call setup, monitoring and billing processes for ICS is of high importance. In particular, since collect and other special billing arrangements are common in the provision of ICS, avoidance of costs associated with human operators to provide step-by-step controls for ICS has long been recognized. U.S. Pat. No. 4,054,756, issued Oct. 18, 1977 to Comella and Yokelson discloses a system and method for automating many operator services, including playing of recorded announcements, collection of information from calling and called parties, call setup and billing based on such inputs. Use of functionality like that described in the last-cited patent has therefore found application in the provision of ICS.
As computing power has greatly increased and been made available in the form of now-ubiquitous personal computers, the Comella, et al. teachings have been adapted to provide much of the computing power used to provide ICS. In particular, providing ICS to inmates in confinement facilities has lately been accomplished through the use of analog telephone station equipment (usually hardened versions of basic home or office telephone sets) connected to one or more personal computers located on-premises at correctional facility locations. Such computers are used, among other things, to control telephone access to the PSTN, record conversations as appropriate, and to generate and record Station Message Detail Reporting (SMDR) data for use in billing calls made from the correctional facility.
FIG. 1 shows a functional network diagram representation of a typical prior art ICS systems, including apparatus installed at a correctional facility connected to the PSTN. In particular, a telephone facility 100 is shown as including a plurality of analog telephone sets 101-i, i=1, 2, . . . , N, illustratively connected to control computer 110. Telephone sets 101-i and computer 110 may be physically located in different areas or different buildings of a correctional facility; more than one control computer 110 may be employed if required to meet calling volume at the facility. Control computer(s) 110 located on-site within an illustrative correctional facility are typically connected directly to the PSTN via on-site analog loop-start telephone lines or, in some cases, multiplexed digital connections, e.g., T1 carrier links. Personal computer-based control computer 110 typically includes a plurality of peripheral interface cards to accomplish connectivity between the analog stations and the PSTN. Illustratively, Intel Dialogic D/4PCI cards are used to interface to up to four input telephone sets per card. In some applications, up to 16 such cards can be used in a single computer to provide access to PSTN 120 for up to 64 telephone sets. Other particular Intel cards can provide much higher line coverage. While the illustrative Intel cards provides functionality for detecting ringing associated with incoming calls, ICS calling is typically limited to providing only outbound calling from the correctional institution.
The one or more control computers 110 at each correctional facility site, in cooperation with PSTN functionality provided off-site by local and long distance telephone companies, control the sequence of events required to complete ICS calls originated at the correctional facility site to called parties connected to the PSTN. Such calls are typically either collect or debit/prepaid telephone calls to remote called parties identified by inmates using the facilities shown in FIG. 1. In FIG. 1 the PSTN is represented as cloud 120; parts of PSTN 120 are shown outside this cloud to emphasize the part they play in completing the call. In particular, illustrative PSTN switches 140 and 145 are shown serving representative stations, shown as telephones 170 and 160, respectively, in FIG. 1. Telephone station set 160, by way of example, is indicated as the called party's telephone set.
The owner or provider of the on-site telephony equipment and ICS incurs purchase, operation and maintenance costs associated with the completion of such calls, and seeks a profit by charging a rate for ICS calls that repays both the fixed costs (equipment, maintenance and other) and the variable per-call costs that the provider incurs for use of PSTN 120.
As will be appreciated from the foregoing, control computer costs, telephone line use costs, and maintenance costs associated with ensuring a high level of system up-time at many geographically distributed (on-correctional-site) installations—each including complex computer hardware and associated software—can be burdensome and expensive.
Voice over IP (VOIP) techniques using the Internet or other data networks offer possible alternatives to a range of existing business and residential communications systems. In particular, VOIP systems are emerging as candidate implementations for a variety of enterprise communications solutions. One illustrative example of such systems is available from Quintum Technologies. Residential use, as illustrated by AT&T's CallVantage VOIP service over high-speed cable connections, and digital subscriber line Internet connections by local exchange carriers and others, is also emerging as a possible alternative to local and long distance calling using traditional Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS). A formal XML Schema for IP-based voice telephony service is included as Exhibit ipdr-1in incorporated provisional application 1.
A particular aspect of collect, bill-to-third-party, and calls involving other particular billing options is that of billing validation. Billing validation relates generally to validating the availability of identified accounts for billing of a call, and has proven to be especially important for inmate calling. Thus, for example, validation is commonly sought for collect calls to determine that the account, including called party account numbers, exist and are of a class for which billing can be accomplished by one or more billing entities. In some cases, as, for example, for at least some calls to a called party at a cellular account number, it is often difficult to ensure billing for the benefit of an ICS provider placing the call on behalf of a calling party. Often bills for calls completed to a variety of called party destination types prove to be uncollectible unless complex, expensive and time-consuming validation techniques are used. Further, these techniques are applied in prior practice even when a call is not completed, as when the called number is busy or a called party fails to answer.
Because of the rise in popularity of cellular and other portable telephone devices, many of which do not provide billing collection services for calls placed by wireline ICS providers, an important step in insuring payment for ICS is to verify the type of service subscribed to by the called party for ICS calls. Perhaps even more important in this regard is the rise of CLECs or Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, who often lack the ability or inclination to provide billing collection for calls processed by an ICS provider. CLECs are to be contrasted with the traditional incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs), such as a Regional Bell Operating Company (RBOC).
Some estimates report that upwards of 20 percent of calls sought to be completed by ICS providers are ultimately to be completed by CLECs. When combined with mobile services such as cellular telephone services for which billing is sometimes problematic, the combined percentage of calls potentially associated with billing problems can easily approach or exceed twenty-five percent.
To help reduce the number of calls completed to telephone stations associated with cellular service, CLEC and other services that do not ensure collection and payment of charges for ICSs, and for other service providers concerned about billing of charges for services rendered, a number of databases are maintained by the telephone industry for checking the status of particular telephone lines. In particular, so-called Line Identification Databases (LIDB databases) provide a variety of information for telephone lines. Thus, a database query launched to a LIDB or similar database for a call can provide some information relating to whether calls to a particular line (and the account and phone number associated with it) can be counted on (or not) to be billed by the number provider.
Other databases having special information about particular telephone subscriber accounts may also be maintained, including, generally, a class known as billed number screening databases or by other particular names. Some of these are maintained locally by service providers based on past history of payment, credit or other factors. All of these may help service providers, including ICS providers, to increase the share of calls that can actually be billed, thereby increasing the share of calls for which charges are actually collected.
As might be expected, use of LIDB and other telephone line or account databases by service providers seeking information about particular telephone lines or accounts incurs charges by the providers of such databases. Since data commonly found in such databases is available more easily to some industry participants than others, concern is sometimes expressed by those querying the database as to these charges and conditions associated with use of the databases. In particular, a significant percentage of calls for which line or account databases (hereinafter, LIDB databases) are queried (i.e., for which so-called database dips are performed) prove to be no-revenue calls. This no-revenue condition can arise because the LIDB data raises issues about the likelihood of being able to bill for the call. For example, the unlikely ability to bill for the call may be indicated by a database response indicating no data is available for the particular line/account (hereinafter, line). In some cases, it is possible to arrange for alternative payment methods by which a called party can pay for received calls, even if such payment options are not reflected in the LIDB database response. But by the time such arrangements have been made, a LIDB dip may well have been performed, and a cost to the ICS provider incurred.
Further, even if the line information received in response to a LIDB dip appears to warrant the completion of a call in the expectation of being able to bill for the call, the call may not be completed, e.g., because of a busy line or a no-answer condition at the time of the call. As to conditions associated with LIDB services, it is often required that even successive calls to the same number must employ a separate LIDB dip, thus incurring multiple charges for the same information over a short interval. Moreover, storage (or caching) of prior LIDB dip results is typically discouraged under contracts with LIDB database providers. Thus, ICS and other service providers incur substantial costs for LIDB services, even for calls or call attempts for which no revenue will be derived by the ICS provider.
In yet another way that ICS providers incur costs without deriving any revenues involves so-called billed number screening (BNS). Callers attempting to place a third number billed or collect call to a line equipped with BNS will be advised by an announcement that such billing is not authorized and another form of billing is required. Such need for alternative billing arrangements may not be determined before costs of call setup and LIDB dip has been performed, thus incurring cost to an ICS provider. It is obviously preferable that such alternative billing arrangements not be negotiated on each call to a BNS line.
It is therefore desirable for network users, such as ICS providers, to ascertain with increased certainty that calls placed can be billed. Moreover, it is desirable that such calls incur minimum costs to the provider and provide convenience for calling and called parties to an ICS call.
A need therefore exists to provide flexible and economical validation of billing status for called parties or others relied upon by an inmate to pay charges for ICS calls.
A continuing problem in ICS is that though an original called party (e.g., an inmate's lawyer or an approved family member) can be qualified by correctional authorities to receive inmate calls, such calls can sometimes be forwarded, extended, bridged, or otherwise connected to other parties who have not been so qualified. A primary mechanism for permitting calls to such not-qualified persons or locations includes the conference call and call forwarding functionality available to many PSTN users. In the sequel, all multi-party, conference, forwarded, bridged, or otherwise extended calls will be referred to as conference calls or 3-way calls—irrespective of the actual number of stations involved and irrespective of the particular mechanism used to establish or maintain the call—unless the context requires otherwise. It should be borne in mind that some 3-way calls may be authorized, e.g., to simultaneously discuss a legal issue with an attorney and spouse, or with two attorneys at different locations.
Many techniques have been developed to attempt to thwart unauthorized 3-way calling. These have often employed monitoring a calling line to detect hook-flashes or other signals characteristic of a 3-way call attempt for an ongoing call. A number of problems with such techniques have long been recognized, including false-positive indications. Claims for successful detection of unauthorized 3-way calls on inmate calls have frequently been regarded as dubious. It is therefore desirable to control inmate calling behavior by seeking to positively detect unauthorized 3-way calling, but to permit 3-way calling when properly authorized.
Applicants have further recognized that present implementations of existing features and the introduction of new features in existing ICS systems and methods often suffer limitations imposed by current personal computer-based on-site computers and PSTN communications links and processes. Areas in which ICS systems and methods are currently limited include (i) location of processing assets on-site at correctional institutions, thereby limiting or precluding ready access to specialized or high-powered computing and communications resources, (ii) establishing the identity of a calling inmate with a high degree of certainty, (iii) rapidly and economically recording, monitoring, storing and selectively playing back inmate conversations to serve a variety of law enforcement needs, and (iv) identifying with a high degree of certainty when unauthorized persons receive (including by forwarding) or are added to calls originated by calling inmates.